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This paper examines the individual determinants of ethnic identiﬁcation using
large sample surveys (about 30,000 respondents) representative of seven capitals
of West-African countries. A small model that relates ethnic identiﬁcation to an
investment in ethnic capital suggests that individuals initially deprived of social
or human capital resort to ethnicity to get socially inserted, and do even more
so if their ethnic group itself is well inserted. Empirical results are consistent
with this simple theory. First, education lowers ethnic salience. Second, ethnic
identiﬁcation is higher for uneducated unemployed or informal workers who seek
a new or better job, and is further raised by the share of the individual’s ethnic
group integrated on the job market. Third, ethnic identiﬁcation is higher among
migrants, and raised by the share of the migrant’s ethnic group that is employed.
Group solidarity makes ethnic identity more salient for individuals deprived of
other means for upward mobility.
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1The salience of ethnicity in heterogenous societies has been shown to vary a great deal
across time and space (Posner 2004a) (Chandra 2005). In the search for the reasons for
this variation, the impact of political competition has drawn most of the attention so
far1. For example, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) show in a recent paper how ethnic
identiﬁcation raises around election times, to the detriment of class and occupation
identities. This approach focuses on the role of elites which may manipulate or exploit
the feelings of ethnic loyalty and rivalry to achieve their goals, and builds on a variety
of studies dedicated to the relationships between ethnicity and politics (Brass 1976)
(Salamone 1985). In this top-down setting, the elite’s quest for power appears as the
driving force that fosters the salience and mobilization of ethnic belongings. The focus
is put on the collective determinants of ethnic salience.
However, little has been written on the individual, grassroots incentives to relate to
one’s ethnic group, so that within-group individual variation in ethnic identiﬁcation
may well be a missing link in our understanding of the determinants of ethnic salience.
Reverting the perspective is consistent with a deﬁnition of identity that considers it as
a ﬂuid, multi-dimensional and context-speciﬁc notion, and therefore opens way to vari-
ations across individuals within the same ethnic group. Fearon (1999) deﬁnes identity
as the speciﬁc way an individual positions himself in the multiple social stratiﬁcations,
which may change along with the individual’s interests at a certain point or in a cer-
tain context (Fearon 2003). There might therefore be important variations in ethnic
identiﬁcation across individuals, just as social and economic situations also vary. This
understanding of identity underpins the present paper.
What kind of interests would then push individuals to emphasize their ethnic be-
longing? The persistence of ethnic identities in a changing world has led scholars to
investigate what beneﬁts ethnic groups provide to their members (Glazer and Moyni-
han 1963), as ethnic groups have proved to be functional not only for the elite or to
the various contenders for power, but also for any group member in certain contexts.
In a seminal paper, Bates (1974) suggests that ethnic groups persist "because of their
capacity to extract goods and services from the modern sector and thereby satisfy the
demands of their members for the components of modernity". The combination of this
assertion and the deﬁnition of identity mentioned above suggests that ethnic identi-
ﬁcation might reﬂect the demand of individuals for ethnic-based goods and services,
and not only manipulations by the political elite.
Identifying the channels through which ethnic groups may provide such amenities is key
to isolate the microfoundations of ethnic identiﬁcation at the individual level. The lit-
erature on social networks and social capital provides many useful insights here. Social
proximity - due to common ethnicity or to any other common characteristic - has been
shown to bring beneﬁts to individuals in some speciﬁc social and economic contexts
(Arrow 1972): solutions to agency problems in the enforceability of trade contracts
(Greif 1993), formation of mutual insurance networks (Fafchamps 1992), ﬁnancial de-
cisions (Karlan 2007) or integration on the job market (Granovetter 1974). Ethnicity
1See Norris and Mattes (2003), Miguel (2004), Posner (2004b), Miguel and Gugerty (2005), Posner
(2006)
2as a set of descent-based attributes (Chandra 2006), is eﬃcient in building such so-
cial networks. Common ethnicity can be used as a "social focal point" (Habyarimana
et al. 2006) that allows individuals to solve coordination problems, even if common
membership does not carry pre-existing social rules or common tastes (Habyarimana
et al. 2007). Ethnic membership appears as a resource in social capital that provides
signiﬁcant social and economic returns, and therefore pushes individuals to identify
with their ethnic group.
In this paper I ﬁrst present a simple model of investment in social capital2 (Glaeser,
Laibson, and Sacerdote 2002) and argue that ethnic identiﬁcation reﬂects an individual
demand for this particular form of capital. I refer to the notion of social capital as
deﬁned by Bourdieu (1986) as a measure of the individual’s amount of relationships
or size of networks. Individual stocks of social capital then aggregate (Brehm and
Rahn 1997) to form the set of norms, attitudes and trust that characterize a commu-
nity or society (Putnam 1995). The model suggests that the demand for ethnicity is
higher when individuals are initially deprived of social capital, and therefore have high
marginal returns to their investment. It is also higher for individuals whose ethnic
group may eﬀectively supply those ethnic-based amenities needed. This simple model
predicts that individuals with a low education and limited local networks (such as
recent migrants) have a higher probability of identifying with their ethnic group. It
also predicts that the share of the ethnic group integrated on the job market raises the
returns individuals get from their group membership, and will drive up the individual’s
identiﬁcation.
I then test the predictions of this model on an original survey dataset that includes more
than 30,000 respondents representative of seven major cities in West Africa. Consistent
with the model, I show strong and robust evidence that being poorly educated, left out
of the formal job market, and a migrant from rural areas increases ethnic identiﬁcation.
I also ﬁnd that the level of integration of an individual’s ethnic group on the job market
drives up her level of ethnic identiﬁcation, which again concurs with the hypothesis
that ethnic identiﬁcation reﬂects a demand for networks and social capital.
The article makes three important contributions. First, it directly examines the de-
terminants of ethnic salience at the individual level, without using proximal variables
that are only assumed to be related to ethnic salience. A nascent literature uses Afro-
barometer data to do so (see notably Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010)), and it is
primarily important to add a diﬀerent data source to this body of research. Second,
this article focuses on within-group variations in ethnic salience at the individual level,
a dimension left aside in previous empirical studies. Here I focus on day-to-day ethnic
identiﬁcation at the grassroots level, which complements the elite-driven mechanisms
by forming the demand side of ethnic salience. Third, I take advantage of the size of
the sample to build robust estimates of ethnic group socio-economic characteristics at
the local level, instead of nation-wide census data of dubious quality and uncertain
relevance at the individual level. For the ﬁrst time in this literature, I use interaction
models to incorporate ethnic group socio-economic characteristics in my analysis of
2For a comprehensive survey on this notion, see Coleman (1990), Putnam (1995) and Sobel (2002).
3individual determinants, which allows a ﬁne assessment of the relationship between
individual and ethnic group characteristics.
The paper is organized as follows. I ﬁrst lay out this small theoretical framework and
derive a set of predictions (section 1). After having presented the data in section 2,
I examine the individual characteristics that raise the importance of ethnic identiﬁ-
cation (section 3). The impact of low education, migration and unemployment stand
out. Taking advantage of the presence of several respondents in a same household,
I introduce household ﬁxed eﬀects and show that those results hold when household
idiosyncracies are canceled out. In section 4, I then turn to the eﬀect of the position
of the ethnic group on the job market, which might determine how valuable it is to
claim one’s attachment to it. When individuals are willing to experience occupational
mobility, they identify to their ethnic group if its insertion on the job market may help
them reach a better job. I discuss this set of results, their link to sociological literature
and possible alternative interpretations in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 A small model of investment in ethnic capital
I consider an individual who belongs to an ethnic group ϵ. Her well-being depends
positively on her level of human capital, which is a combination of an initial stock
K0  0 and of a ﬂux of social capital on which decisions are made. K0 typically
depends on the individual’s family background, level of education or social insertion,
and is exogenous. The ﬂux of social capital critically depends on the involvement of
individuals in ethnic networks, which can be thought of as an investment in ethnic
capital and is denoted θ  0. It corresponds intuitively to the number of persons
contacted for help on the ground of common membership, the time spent in meeting
other members of the ethnic group, or the energy spent on seeking information from
the ethnic group. The returns to such an investment are determined by the extent to
which the ethnic group is well positioned on the socio-economic ladder, typically on
the job market. Sϵ is the share of the ethnic group ϵ that is eﬀectively in a position
to help the individual. This parameter is exogenous. In my framework, ethnicity is
similar to a non-rival public good. The returns to investment are not aﬀected by any
queuing eﬀect.







Note that the returns of investments in ethnic capital are positive and marginally
decreasing: ∂R
∂θ  0, ∂2R
∂θ2  0. The intuition for this is quite simple. Imagine an
individual who seeks an increase in social capital and gets in touch with all the persons
he can think of on the ground of common membership to the ethnic group. The ﬁrst
person will presumably help him make the ﬁrst steps in the ethnic network, give him
4the basic information he has to know about the job market for instance, and may open
many doors. If the individual continues to invest in ethnic capital and increases θ,
the next person contacted may help but the bulk of the information would have been
already transmitted. The tenth person might provide little returns, even if it happens
that she is the one who provides the marginal surplus that helps the individual go
beyond the threshold required for, say, getting a job in the formal sector. It is thus
sensible to assume that returns are marginally decreasing.
Without any investment in ethnic capital (θ = 0), a person can rely on an amount
of human capital corresponding to the initial stock accumulated K0 > 0, which might
include literacy, diplomas, people already part of the network, integration to neighbor-
hood or community life. Conversely, an individual who has never been to school and
doesn’t have any pre-existing social relationships can only rely on the returns to his
investment in ethnic capital. K0 and θ are therefore substitutes in a marginally de-
creasing production function. The higher K0, the lower the returns to a given amount
of θ: investment in ethnic capital only helps to reach out to the people who are not
already part of the network initially accumulated.
Figure 1: Returns of θ for a positive K0
Resorting to ethnic investment, however, has costs: it is necessarily time and energy-
consuming, so there is an opportunity cost attached to it. It also creates an obligation
to reciprocate. Being involved in social networks and taking advantage of them also
implies that the individual might later be asked to also give some of his time, informa-
tion, contacts etc. The cost C(θ) of investment θ corresponds intuitively to the sum of
a cost of opportunity and of a series of future reimbursements. The cost of opportunity
is proportional to the investment, and I assume the series of reimbursements convergent
to a ﬁnite limit - an inﬁnite limit would imply an inﬁnite obligation to reimburse and
thus deter any use of ethnic networks.
C(θ) = cθ (2)
5For simplicity, I assume that the cost function is linear, contrary to the returns function:
when the individual establishes a contact with any relationship or relative, he opens
a form of drawing right for this person, no matter if he or she is the ﬁrst or tenth
person contacted. The time and energy spent in such an increase in ethnic capital have
no strong reason to increase or decrease, and the liability created is the same for the
individual, whatever the low level of returns provided.
The individual’s program is the following:



























It may easily be veriﬁed that θ⋆ is a negative function of K0 and a positive function of Sϵ.
Beyond a certain threshold of initial social capital (Sϵ
c )
Sϵ
1 Sϵ, investment in ethnic capital
would only provide negative returns because costs outweigh returns 3. Individuals with
a high initial stock of capital do not invest in their ethnic relationships, but rather rely
on the high level of integration they already reached and avoid the costs attached to
an investment in ethnic capital.
The predictions of this small framework are twofold. First, the negative eﬀect of K0
implies that educated individuals would tend to identify less with their ethnic group,
as they don’t need this investment to have access to good jobs or other opportunities.
Conversely, people who are initially deprived of social capital, because they are less ed-
ucated or left out of the job market, might exhibit higher levels of ethnic identiﬁcation.
This eﬀect might also play out for individuals who have left their local networks and are
in need of accumulating social capital in their new place of living. I should therefore see
a higher propensity to ethnic identiﬁcation among migrants. Further, as the accumu-
lation of social capital is a life-long process, youngsters who are just getting started in
their work career may invest more in ethnic capital than more mature individuals who
have already established their networks. There may also be a gender eﬀect: if I assume
that men tend to have more relationships to their community than women who are
more conﬁned to their household or immediate neighborhood, then men should show a
lower level of ethnic identiﬁcation. Finally, social capital is very much determined by
intergenerational transmissions. An important reason for initial deprivation of social
capital is that the father himself has little social capital. Since my empirical setting is
3The cost related to the duty to reciprocate is very similar to the argument raised by Luke and
Munshi (2006), who explain that high-ability individuals are less likely to get married because they
do not really need marriage to get employed but would nevertheless bear the cost of high remittances
to be sent to the extended family.
6urban, having a father farmer would indicate an initial deprivation of connections in
the urban world and therefore push up the level of ethnic identiﬁcation.
Second, the positive impact of Sϵ means that the share of the ethnic group that is in a
position to help the individual drives up the level of ethnic identiﬁcation. The relevant
characteristics of the group might well depend on the position of the individual himself.
While the share of one’s group integrated on the job market may be an asset irrespective
of one’s particular position, an informal worker may be more speciﬁcally interested in
the share of his group in the formal sector, a formal worker may be interested in the
share of this group in the public sector, etc.
2 Data and Methodology
In this paper I use a set of seven "1-2-3" surveys that were carried out by DIAL,
AFRISTAT and the National Institutes of Statistics in the main cities of seven West-
African countries: Cotonou (Benin), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Abidjan (Côte
d’Ivoire), Bamako (Mali), Niamey (Niger), Dakar (Senegal) and Lome (Togo). These
surveys are identical and therefore strictly comparable. They were carried on in the
early 2000s on large samples representative of the urban population.
The surveys all include the following question: "which group (or community) are you
the most proud to belong to?". Two answers are possible: the ethnic group or the
nation. The survey in Dakar is the only one which includes religion as a third possible
answer. This may not be mixed up with ethnicity, all the more as 92% of the sample in
Dakar declares being Muslim. I thus considered that religious identiﬁcation may more
accurately be aggregated to national identiﬁcation. This leads to quite homogeneous
rates of ethnic identiﬁcation in the seven main cities (Figure 2). In this paper I refer
to ethnic identiﬁcation, or ethnic salience, as the likelihood that individuals mention
their ethnic group as the group or community they are proud to belong to.
The question conﬁnes the respondent to a choice between two possibilities (ethnic group
or nation). This bars individuals from claiming pride in class, occupation, gender,
religion etc. Though restrictive, this question interrogates the interactions between
ethnicity, nation-building and democracy, a critical research ﬁeld in political science
(Charney 2003). Ever since the independence and the creation of heterogenous, often
artiﬁcial nation States, a looming interrogation pertains to the conditions for ethnic
groups in Africa to merge and dissolve into a national political ﬁeld where national
interest would subsume ethnic identities (Miles and Rochefort 1991). The dual choice
oﬀered to survey respondents may therefore shed light on a burning question. In their
study, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) face the exact opposite problem as their survey
question oﬀers several possible identiﬁcation groups, but not the nation. My paper may
be seen as a useful complement to that extent as well. It is reassuring to see that the
levels of absolute ethnic identiﬁcation (Figure 2) are quite similar across surveys (31%
across 10 countries in the Afrobarometer data, 24% here). This suggests that ethnic
identiﬁcation is little dependent of alternative choices. The great advantages of this
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Figure 2: Frequency of ethnic identiﬁcation in the main cities of seven countries
data are well described in Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), as well as their limitations.
The survey methodology and purpose being similar in this case, I refer to their remarks.
I would add that in both sets of surveys, the question leaves the respondent free to
mentally refer to any ethnic group or sub-group of which he considers to be a member,
which avoids the pitfall of imposing ethnic categories often at odds with the reality of
ethnic structures and perceptions.
I then include a range of variables that describe the individual’s situation in terms of
education, occupation and migration status, along with classical demographical infor-
mation. To study the alternative between national identiﬁcation and ethnic identiﬁ-
cation, it makes sense to restrict the sample to adults - individuals older than 18 -
who have the nationality of the country considered. My ﬁnal sample includes 30,042
individuals older than 18. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1.
3 Individual social position and ethnic identiﬁcation
The survey data enables me to test several key predictions of my simple model. I
regress the binary variable "to be more proud of one’s ethnic group", a measure of
ethnic identiﬁcation, on the set of individual characteristics presented above. I include
country ﬁxed eﬀects to control for national speciﬁcities, but my results hold without
including them. My method is similar to the one used by Eifert, Miguel, and Posner
(2010). I use logit estimations. Results are displayed in Table 2.
8Burkina Côte
Benin Faso d’Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo Total
Demographical background
Father farmer (%) 36.2 52.2 47.8 37.2 47.7 28.2 40.7 40.7
Female (%) 51.6 45.1 49.3 48.8 50.8 55.6 46.3 50.8
Age 34.5 35.2 31.9 35.2 35.0 35.4 35.5 34.0
Size of the household 5.8 7.1 6.8 7.9 8.0 9.9 4.7 7.5
Migration
Born in the same place (%) 50.4 43.6 32.6 48.1 43.0 60.9 39.0 47.63
Migrant from an urban area (%) 29.4 43.8 58.7 35.0 31.5 28.5 46.4 35.81
Migrant from a rural area (%) 20.2 12.6 9.1 16.9 25.5 10.7 14.6 16.56
Education
Never attended school (%) 21.5 42.1 21.5 48.0 43.4 35.2 17.5 30.5
At least attended
primary school (%) 30.2 22.8 25.1 15.3 19.9 33.4 32.2 26.1
At least attended
secondary school (%) 36.6 28.1 39.4 30.1 27.9 25.3 43.4 33.4
At least attended
post-secondary school (%) 11.6 6.9 14.0 6.6 8.7 6.2 6.8 10.0
Occupation
Inactive excl. students (%) 11.9 12.2 9.7 17.7 22.9 22.3 8.8 15.1
Student (%) 11.2 6.2 10.4 8.2 7.9 6.4 4.8 8.7
Unemployed (%) 5.8 13.4 15.6 9.9 16.0 15.9 9.7 13.4
Formal private sector (%) 7.9 7.4 14.4 8.2 6.6 8.8 8.3 10.3
Informal private sector (%) 56.0 49.6 43.8 48.1 36.1 41.7 60.9 45.6
Civil servant (%) 7.1 9.6 6.1 7.5 10.1 4.6 7.3 6.6
Observations 6,028 1,642 3,752 4,399 6,050 6,668 1,503 30,042
Table 1: Country-wise description of the survey sample
My small model of investment in ethnic capital leads me ﬁrst to examine the eﬀects of
the individual amount of social capital (K0) on the level of ethnic identiﬁcation. The
main determinants of this initial stock of social capital are the level of education, the
migration status, the father’s level of social capital, and the position on the job market.
I also examine the impact of demographic variables such as gender and age.
Education stands out as a very robust and signiﬁcant deterrent of ethnic identiﬁcation,
with the highest magnitude: whatever the speciﬁcation of the model, being educated
has a strong negative eﬀect on the propensity to refer to the ethnic group. All education
modalities included in the regression have signiﬁcant negative impacts as compared to
the omitted variable "having never attended school" (which concerns between 17.5% of
the population in Lome, Togo, and 48.0% in Bamako, Mali). This ﬁnding is robust to
shifts in the deﬁnition of education levels. Including the continuous variable "number
of school years" instead of education classes yields the same result. Furthermore, the
impact increases with the level attained: absolute values of marginal eﬀects increase
with the level of education attained. When all other parameters are controlled for
(column 4), having attended primary school lowers the probability of referring to the
ethnic group by 2 percentage points, having attended secondary level lowers it by 6
percentage points and post-secondary education (a level reached by less than 10% of
the sample) by more than 8 percentage points.
9(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.08***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Age*10 -0.01** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Father farmer 0.05*** 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Migrant from a rural area 0.03*** 0.03** 0.03** 0.06**
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
Migrant from an urban area 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
Attended primary school -0.02** -0.02** -0.03
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Attended middle or secondary school -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.07***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08)








Private informal sector 0.04* 0.04
(0.10) (0.12)
Private formal sector 0.04* 0.02
(0.12) (0.14)
Fixed eﬀects country country country country household
Observations 21596 20789 20733 20733 7923
Pseudo R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
Columns 1-4: Logit estimations; Column 5: Conditional logit estimation with household ﬁxed
eﬀects. Marginal-eﬀect estimates are presented (at mean values for the explanatory variables).
Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero at 90% (*), 95% (**), 99% (***)
conﬁdence levels. Omitted migration status: "born in the city". Omitted education level: "never
attended school". Omitted occupation: "civil servant".
Table 2: Individual determinants of ethnic identiﬁcation
Those results on education contradict certain predictions of the second generation of
modernization theories that suggest education would raise ethnic identiﬁcation as a
result of increased competition in the modern sector (Bates 1974). In these theories,
education is viewed as an attribute of modernity, along with urbanity, inclusion in the
formal sector, or political empowerment. Since competition is said to be higher in the
modern world, educated individuals appear to develop more ethnic-based strategies.
A ﬁrst reason for this discrepancy may be that the surveys used in this paper are ur-
ban, located in the main cities of each country, and regressions include controls for the
employment status. So my results on education are not driven by other correlates of
modernity like urbanity or inclusion in the formal sector, and may therefore be inter-
preted as "all other aspects of modernity being equal". I show that within the urban
world, conditional on other observable variables, education weakens ethnic identiﬁca-
tion, although I can not exclude that a diﬀerent result may be found at a national
10level. A second reason may be that modernization theories underestimate the level
of competition at the grassroots level, and the fact that in social competition, ethnic
strategies may be substitutes to qualiﬁcation and diplomas, rather than complements.
My results concur to the idea that competition raises ethnic identiﬁcation, but suggest
that competition is ﬁercer in other segments of the population.
Another interpretation of the results on education is that there is a straightforward
impact of education on values and identities, through the provision of knowledge and
openness that enable people to relate to their nation. Studies, especially higher educa-
tion, are also a time where interactions with people of diﬀerent backgrounds are more
frequent, which may decrease the sense of ethnicity. Education would directly decrease
the subjective relevance of ethnicity, not its instrumental use. My empirical strategy
does not allow me to separate out this eﬀect from the fact that being educated makes it
less necessary to rely on ethnic solidarity to reach one’s objectives, typically of ﬁnding
a good job. But the instrumental interpretation ﬁnds support in many earlier studies
and in my other results.
Given the extent of intergenerational transmission of social capital (Bourdieu and
Passeron 1979), a second key determinant of the initial amount of social capital is
the family background. The surveys allow us to incorporate this dimension as they
include a question on the father’s occupation when the respondent was 15 years old.
Having a father farmer at the age of 15 arguably indicates a low level of inherited
social capital in the urban world. Results show indeed that having a father farmer
increases ethnic salience by 5 percentage points when this variable is introduced along
with demographical indicators only (column 1), even though the magnitude and sig-
niﬁcance decrease when educational variables are added to the regression (columns 3
and 4). There is therefore both a direct eﬀect of familial legacy of social capital, and
an indirect eﬀect of intergenerational rigidity in schooling opportunities, as having a
father farmer impacts negatively on educational attainment in Africa (Bossuroy and
Cogneau 2008).
The impact of migration status is well aligned with those results. Three categories
may be constructed from the results of the survey: people born in the main city,
people born in another urban area (excluding the main city) and people born in a
rural area. Table 1 shows that natives represent about a half of the population of
the capitals, while urban migrants represent between 30 and 50% of the rest. Being a
migrant, regardless of origin, appears as a strong determinant for salience of ethnicity.
A ﬁrst explanation may be that for cultural reasons, people born in the main city
have a diﬀerent set of values and feel prouder of their nation, maybe as an eﬀect of
living in open, cosmopolitan cities as opposed to isolated hamlets. But in the baseline
regressions with country ﬁxed eﬀects (columns 2 to 4), being a migrant from an urban
area shows a similar impact as being a migrant from a rural area. Ethnic identiﬁcation
might thus reﬂect the use of ethnic ties to get inserted in a new community, which is
necessary for migrants who left their established local networks irrespective of where
they come from.
Including the individual’s occupation status (column 4) reveals that the lower the level
11of integration on the job market, the higher the level of ethnic identiﬁcation. With
the most stable and protected occupational status - civil servant - taken as a reference,
every modality appears to determine positively and signiﬁcantly the level of ethnic
identiﬁcation. One may argue that I only capture the fact that civil servants have
a certain ethos that makes them more prone to refer to the nation for which they
work on a daily basis. But it is striking that being out of the job market (either as
student or with any other kind of inactive status) does not have any signiﬁcant impact
on ethnic identiﬁcation when compared to being a civil servant. Inactivity is speciﬁc
in that it is a situation where low competition prevails, since individuals are not (or
no more) competing in the job market. Competition does hold among students, but
being successful in the studies is not the same as being integrated on the job market:
in principle, interpersonal connections and social networks are less necessary. So it
may be that the level of precariousness that individuals experience on the job market
determines their degree of ethnic identiﬁcation, because of the will to experience an
upward occupational mobility and the eﬃciency of strategies based on ethnic networks.
The insertion of the ethnic group itself should therefore be examined, which I do in
section 4. Interestingly, introducing a revenue variable does not help to explain the
salience of ethnicity (results not shown), a ﬁnding that is consistent with the notion
that the occupational status is the driving force.
The strategic dimension of ethnic identiﬁcation for occupational mobility is tough to
identify, since the eﬀect is endogenous by nature: being in a precarious situation may
lead people to strategically mobilize their ethnic membership, which in turn is sup-
posed to improve their situation. However, the possible bias would cause the eﬀects
to be underestimated and not overestimated: since ethnic identiﬁcation reduces the
probability of, say, unemployment, the impact of unemployment on the propensity
to refer to one’s ethnic group should be even more important than what I observe.
The job market status thus appears to have an inﬂuence, which might be related to
the strategic use of ethnic ties for upward mobility and will be investigated further in
section 4.
The impact of demographic variables is consistent with the predictions of my model.
Females appear to identify more to their ethnic group. As I also include other co-
variates in the regression, this result is not driven by the fact that being a woman is
associated with some speciﬁc characteristics on education, migration, integration on
the job market, etc. As suggested above, this may be due to the fact that women are
often less active in the social life of the extended community and are less naturally
in touch with "useful" ethnic mates than men. Ethnic identiﬁcation decreases signiﬁ-
cantly with age, though by a small magnitude (1 percentage point per decade). Older
people show a lower propensity to ethnic identiﬁcation, although they are often thought
to be more attached to traditional values, while younger people are seen as vectors of
modernity. This might reﬂect the need for youngsters to build their networks and ﬁnd
their way in the social hierarchy, whereas older people have accumulated social capital
for a longer period of time and need less support from ethnic networks. There results
on age are robust to changes in speciﬁcation like introducing age in a quadratic func-
tion, introducing a discrete variable of age classes or dropping the education variables
12that could interact with the eﬀect of age, in a context where schooling rapidly increases
over generations in Africa.
Values and identities are very much inﬂuenced by other household members. A regres-
sion run on the sub-sample of households where fathers and sons are both respondents
shows that the father’s ethnic identiﬁcation is strongly correlated with the son’s (the
estimated impact is about 30 percentage points - results not shown). To control for this
background family eﬀect, I use a conditional logistic regression and introduce household
ﬁxed eﬀects (column 5). This estimation strategy skims oﬀ what drives the individual’s
deviation from the household average. It is therefore restricted to households where
there is intra-household heterogeneity in the variable of interest, hence the smaller
number of observations. Results show that the critical drivers are migration from a
rural area, high levels of education and unemployment. The impact of being a woman
obviously stays unaﬀected by controlling for household ﬁxed eﬀects.
My results on individual characteristics are quite consistent with the predictions of
the model of investment in ethnic capital. Being deprived of other dimensions of
human capital (low education, migration) drive ethnic identiﬁcation, as well as having
a precarious job situation. The insertion of the ethnic group on the job market, a key
parameter for individuals to try and take advantage of their group membership, is yet
to be examined.
4 Ethnic group position on the job market and ethnic
identiﬁcation
Occupational position determines the level of ethnic identiﬁcation because individuals
may take advantage of their ethnic belonging to make their way on the job market.
People who do not have a suﬃcient amount of human capital or social capital may
play the ethnic card to ﬁnd a new job or have a promotion. When asked how they
found their job, 38.5% of employed respondents answer that they found it "through
personal relationships (friends, family members)", as opposed to job advertisements,
public placement services, direct contact with employers or competitive entrance exams.
This number is as high as 67.1% of unemployed respondents when asked how they are
looking for a job. Social networks clearly matter a great deal for job search.
The will to ﬁnd or change job may be observed in the survey data. In a section on
occupational perspectives, the respondent declares whether she intends to ﬁnd a job,
or ﬁnd a new job in the same ﬁrm - having a promotion - or ﬁnd a new job in a
diﬀerent ﬁrm, or to keep her position (including unemployed or inactive). In the ﬁrst
three cases, the individual is asked in how many years she thinks she will obtain this
new position. I deﬁne people "eager to change job" as those who want to change their
position and intend to obtain it within a year. The other ones are said "non eager"
either because they are not looking for mobility or because it is a long-term, somewhat
abstract, desire. The distribution of individuals eager to change job across diﬀerent
sub-groups is presented in Table 3.
13All sample 30.7 Female 32.2 Unemployed 65.9
Male 29.4 Informal 24.7
Formal 27 .4
Civil servant 15.3
Non-educated 27.6 Father Father
Primary 30.5 non-educated 29.3 farmer 29.0
Middle / sec 33.5 Father Father
Post-sec 31.7 educated 33.6 non-farmer 32.4
Coverage: active people
Table 3: Eagerness to ﬁnd/change job across demographic and occupational categories
(%)
The share of people eager to ﬁnd or change their job - around 30% of active people
- is quite homogenous across educational, occupational or gender sub-groups, except
for the sub-group of unemployed who of course are massively willing to change their
situation. Not surprisingly, civil servants also stand out with a lower will to change
their position. Aside from those two exceptions, eagerness to move cross-cuts categories
and does not seem to reﬂect any of those other observable characteristics.
The model predicts that individuals with little initial social capital would use ethnic
ties to change or ﬁnd a job. I test this possibility by introducing interaction terms
in the regression (Table 4). Results show that being unemployed or working in the
informal sector signiﬁcantly raises the probability that an individual identiﬁes with
his ethnic group provided that he is not educated and that he is willing to ﬁnd a job
rapidly or to obtain a promotion. For those who don’t long for occupational mobility,
being unemployed or an informal worker does not push them to identify with their
group. Educated individuals might have other ways to get a (better) job when they
are eager to, so that a precarious occupational status does not push to identify along
ethnic lines. In sum, a poor insertion on the job market fosters ethnic identiﬁcation for
those people who want to improve their situation and use this ethnic strategy because
of a lack of human capital.
Uneducated Yes Yes No
Eager to change job Yes No Yes
Unemployed 0.54** 0.07 0.02
(0.02) (0.35) (0.80)
Private informal sector 0.52** 0.06 0.06
(0.02) (0.25) (0.17)
Private formal sector 0.48* 0.10 0.03
(0.06) (0.17) (0.60)
Individual-level covariates yes
Logit estimations with interaction terms. Marginal eﬀects are presented.
P > 2 in parentheses. Coverage: active people.
Table 4: Individual job market status and ethnic identiﬁcation
14The model also predicts that the insertion of the ethnic group itself on the job market
matters a lot for the individual. People will all the more ask for help in their job search
as their co-ethnics actually are in position to do something for them. I examine the
eﬀect of certain characteristics of the ethnic groups on the propensity of their members
to identify with them. For doing this, I use the ethnic group classiﬁcation used in the
surveys and compute ethnic group characteristics. This is made possible by the large
sample size of the surveys and their representativeness. To ensure robustness of these
indicators, I only include in the analysis ethnic groups represented by more than 50
persons in the survey. Table 5 presents the 42 ethnic groups retained across the seven
countries.
Benin Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali
Fon 61.9 Mossi 80.8 Akan 45.3 Bambara 35.1
Adja 20.3 Other Mandings 4.4 North Mande 19.2 Malinke 18.1
Yoruba 10.8 Bissa 4.1 Kru 18.9 Fula 17.0
Other 3.3 Gurunsi* 3.0 Gur 9.7 Sarakole 11.4
Dendi 1.5 Other* 1.9 South Mande 6.9 Senufo 4.2
Yoa/Lopka 1.1 Fula* 1.8 Dogon 4.0
Bariba* 0.6 Dagari/Lobi* 1.3 Songhai 3.6
Betamaribe* 0.3 Gurmanche* 1.2 Bobo 3.1
Fula* 0.3 Bobo* 1.1 Other 1.9
Senufo* 0.5 Arab 1.3
Tuareg* 0.3
Niger Senegal Togo
Zerma 52.0 Wolof 41.28 Adja/Ewe 74.0
Hausa 32.0 Fula 18.87 Kabye/Tem 15.8
Fula 7.4 Serer 13.06 Para/Gurma/Akan 5.0
Tuareg 5.0 Lebou 7.63 Ana/Ife* 2.7
Other 1.6 Jola 5.19 Akposso/Akebou* 1.9
Kanuri 1.4 Other 4.8 Other* 0.7
Gurma* 0.5 Mandinka 3.86
Tubu* 0.1 Sarakole 2.88
Arab* 0.1 Mandyak/Balanta 2.43
Table 5: Ethnic groups and their size (percentage of country samples)
*: ethnic group represented by fewer than 50 individuals in the sample, subsequently dropped from
the analysis
The parameter of interest for an individual is the share of his ethnic group that is in a
good position on the job market relatively to him and could therefore help him. The
relevant group characteristic might vary from one individual to another. For example,
if identiﬁcation is strategic, the unemployed could all the more identify with their group
as the employed share of this group is high, since their primary objective is to ﬁnd a
job. And they may be less inﬂuenced by the share of ethnic group that is employed
in the public sector. But while ﬁnding a job in the public sector appears as a second-
order aspiration for the unemployed, it might be of ﬁrst order for informal workers.
Conversely, the share of employed people would be less important for them since they
are already employed.
In line with the predictions of the model, I also showed in section 3 that migrants
have a speciﬁc relationship to ethnic identiﬁcation. I therefore separate migrants and
people who were born in the city. If groups of migrants actually develop a speciﬁc
15solidarity, the migrant’s strategic identiﬁcation might depend on whether his ethnic
group is represented by an important share of migrants in the city. The larger it is,
the more likely the individual would be to play the ethnic card.
In order to test these hypotheses, I run regressions including the relevant shares of the
ethnic group (one by one for they are embedded) in my baseline regression along with
interaction terms involving the migration status, the will to ﬁnd or change job, and
the occupational status. Results are displayed in Table 6.
Share of Share of Share of
the ethnic group the ethnic group the ethnic group
employed in the civil service migrant and employed
Native eager to change job
Unemployed 0.65** 0.49 -0.00
(0.01) (0.64) (0.98)
Informal worker 0.51** 1.29* 0.21
(0.01) (0.08) (0.19)
Formal worker -0.16 4.55*** 0.27
(0.77) (0.00) (0.32)
Migrant eager to change job
Unemployed 0.84*** -2.34** 0.53**
(0.00) (0.03) (0.02)
Informal worker 0.45** -0.33 0.43***
(0.01) (0.60) (0.00)




Logit estimations with interaction terms. Marginal eﬀects are presented.
Lower panel: P > 2 in parentheses.
Coverage: active people.
Table 6: Ethnic identiﬁcation and group’s insertion on the job market
The share of co-ethnics employed is a powerful incentive to identify along ethnic lines
for people eager to ﬁnd or change their job (ﬁrst column). This pattern is clearer
among unemployed people. The share of employed co-ethnics has a strong, statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on the ethnic identiﬁcation of unemployed people if they declare being
active in looking for a job. This holds both among migrants and natives. Among native
people eager to change or ﬁnd a job, the share of co-ethnics working in the civil service
(middle column) has a strong eﬀect on the ethnic identiﬁcation of employed workers,
either informal or formal. But it has no eﬀect on the unemployed, for whom the decisive
variable is the share of employed people. For all people non eager to ﬁnd or change
their job (migrant or native), the share of co-ethnics in the civil service does not have
any impact (not shown). The share of co-ethnics who are employed migrants has a
strong positive eﬀect on the people who themselves are migrant, either unemployed
or working in the informal sector, and who are looking for a (better) job. Individuals
16craving occupational mobility are pushed to identify with their ethnic group by the
precariousness of their job, and they do even more so as an important share of co-
ethnics is positioned on the rung of the ladder just above them, and may help climb
it.
The methodology used here accounts for the novelty of those results. In their paper,
Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) attempt to measure the impact of individual charac-
teristics on ethnic identiﬁcation, by examining the impact of being young, male, or a
political activist. The fact that they do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant results might be due to the
crudeness of the categories retained, which do not accurately capture the mechanisms
at stake in ethnic identiﬁcation (unemployment, poor education, migration). My re-
sults also emphasize the need to take group characteristics into account. Large survey
samples make it possible to compute group characteristics that are locally accurate and
contemporary to the survey, which ensures their relevance for the individuals surveyed.
It is then essential to analyze the interactions between individual and group character-
istics, as the process of instrumental identiﬁcation essentially brings both dimensions
together. Failing this, aggregate impacts of individual or group characteristics may
even out and be insigniﬁcant.
5 Discussion
Although this study is the ﬁrst to establish a link between ethnic identiﬁcation and
social insertion, the intuition behind it is far from new. It builds on sociological studies
that emphasize the instrumental role of interpersonal ties for various aspects of social
and economic lives of individuals. For instance, since the seminal work by Granovetter
(1974), the importance of extended individual relationships (the "weak ties") has been
shown critical for job search. Kinship networks are a typical example of such weak ties,
and have been shown to be part of individual strategies to integrate into the job market
(Luke and Munshi 2006). My results show that his framework fully applies to the role
of ethnicity for job search in African urban contexts, the "weak ties" of co-ethnicity
being strategically mobilized to reach a more protected position.
The role of ethnic solidarity among migrants has also been extensively studied since
the American urban sociology of the 1920s. The Chicago School of Sociology typically
studied how ethnic groups would help migrants to integrate themselves in American
cities, be it Jews (Wirth 1927), Italians (Whyte 1943) or others. Recently, rigorous
empirical studies have highlighted the role of ethnic networks to help Mexican workers
integrate into the job market in the US (Munshi 2003). Moving to the city entails a shift
in the reference group and a disruption in social connections: individuals leave their
relationships and a familiar environment, and have to reconstruct a network in order
to meet the challenges of urban life and income generation. In an urban multi-ethnic
environment, ethnicity becomes a distinctive element that helps uprooted individuals
rebuild the social capital necessary for successful social interactions (Habyarimana et al.
2006).
17The interpretation of the results relies on the fact that ethnic identiﬁcation reﬂects an
instrumental use of ethnic belonging, in line with recent literature on ethnicity. An
alternative, culturalist interpretation may claim that individuals feel proud of their
ethnic group when the latter is more successful than themselves. This may explain
why jobless, uneducated individuals are more prone to ethnic identiﬁcation, and why
the share of employed co-ethnics drives it up as well. However, a number of results
are inconsistent with this interpretation. First, in this interpretation we would expect
inactive individuals, most of whom are housewives, to present high ethnic identiﬁca-
tion too. They do not. Second, the share of public servants in an ethnic group should
be a matter a pride irrespective of the individual status. We saw that it is true for
formal workers only, with the unemployed being pushed rather to identify with their
ethnic group by the share of employed. Results on the migrants are also very diﬃcult
to interpret with a culturalist view, while being consistent with the instrumental un-
derstanding of ethnic identiﬁcation. To further rule out this alternative interpretation,
I ran regressions with other indicators of success for the ethnic group, like the share of
educated or literate people. They do not show any impact on the individual level of
ethnic identiﬁcation (not shown).
The results I present here complement those on political drivers of ethnic identiﬁcation,
without contradiction. Indeed, if I run similar regressions as Eifert, Miguel, and Posner
(2010) on my (much smaller) set of surveys, I ﬁnd a similar relationship between the
timing of elections and the level of ethnic identiﬁcation, even if the sample size makes
the results very rough. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) oﬀer two possible mechanisms
for their theory, both of which are very much compatible with my results. First,
politicians may "play the ethnic card" around election times to mobilize ethnic vote
banks. My study suggests that this strategy might be particularly successful with those
of their co-ethnics who are economically and socially struggling, and therefore likely
to be involved in ethnic networks. A second interpretation is that voters themselves
anticipate ethnic-based patronage and therefore think along ethnic lines around election
times. Consistently, I suggest here that this identiﬁcation mechanism is even likelier
for those who depend largely on patronage and hands-out to survive, because they are
destitute and have limited capacity to get socially inserted.
6 Conclusion
The results of this paper suggest a new understanding of the relationship between
development and group identities. Individuals left behind in the dynamic transition
may drive ethnic salience up, as ethnic groups take a particular signiﬁcance as a natural
bond between individuals who beneﬁt from the spread of education, urbanity and job
protection, and individuals who yearn for those. The salience would be peak when
a large share of a given ethnic group is deprived of the beneﬁts of development and
depends on intra-group solidarity from their better-oﬀ co-ethnics to have access to some
of those beneﬁts.
18The history of conﬂicts in Congo or Ivory Coast illustrate the process by which a weak
economic system unable to open perspectives to individuals, engenders ethnic mobi-
lization and nurtures conﬂict. In both countries (as in most of Africa), the 1980s have
seen a long economic stagnation that translated into a contraction of public spend-
ing and a raise in unemployment. The coverage and quality of education deteriorated
dramatically after severe cuts in education programs, and diplomas depreciated on the
job market (Proteau 2002). Education was no longer a valuable resource for individ-
ual progress. Large sections of urban youth were left unemployed in the big cities
and engaged in informal, network-based activities to earn some basic livelihood. In
cities, solidarity associations, most of them with an ethnic base, were created to pro-
vide the citizens with such beneﬁts as credit, saving, information, transport to home
villages, etc. (Willame 1998). Networks were also used for extracting rent from cocoa
or minerals, in patronage networks. With export farming being less proﬁtable due
to ﬂuctuations in international prices, rural-urban migrations intensiﬁed and migrant
populations gathered in ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods (Antoine and Coulibaly
1989). The resurgence of ethnic salience fostered inter-group resentment in a context of
economic diﬃculties, which led to radical antagonisms and got further manipulated by
elites. The urban unemployed youth in particular could be very eﬀectively mobilized
by political leaders, the "Jeunes Patriotes" in Ivory Coast (Banégas 2007) or militia in
Congo (Bazenguissa-Ganga 1999) being notorious examples.
Identities therefore appear to be shaped by the inclusiveness of a society. The lack
of openness of the job market and access to education are critical to understanding
why individuals cling to their ethnicity to improve their situation. Much has been said
about politics being a determinant of the salience of ethnic cleavages. We suggest that
the interaction may as well be analyzed the other way round. To a large extent, ethnic
identities might be shaped by social and economic contexts and, in turn, determine
critical political variables such as participation (Siegel 2009), the patterns of patronage
(Kasara 2007), inter-group conﬂicts (Gibson and Gouws 2000) or cooperation (Transue
2007) and voting motivations (Wantchekon 2003). The capacity of the State to provide
its citizens with a ﬂuid job market or widespread education partly determines the
citizen’s attitude to the nation (see Hayward (2003) in the American urban context).
In this respect, the openness of a society, as measured by open access to education
and protected jobs, appears not only as an expected product but as a condition for the
construction of a nation. Active policies in that area therefore not only serve well-being
and equity, but also promote conscious citizenship and inclusive democracy.
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